Cameras and Photography Explained

President Trump this afternoon finally announced his "reciprocal" tariffs, and it's not good news for photography fans in the US.  

Managers at the Japanese camera makers are all currently huddled around big tables trying to figure out how they're going to weather the massive tariffs against their products in a market that comprises about a quarter of their sales. Meanwhile camera dealers across the US are already looking at the recent small uptick in sales with fond memories. 

As with anything Trump, the details seem murky, somewhat contradictory, and subject to change, but the way things are being read right now is that starting on April 9th, shipments to the US are subject to:

• 24% tariff on imports from Japan
• 36% tariff on imports from Thailand
• 46% tariff on imports from Vietnam
• 34% tariff on imports from China (in addition to previous 20%; also deminimis avoidance is cancelled)

(Note that as I update this, various publications are reporting different numbers for China and different interpretations of how the new 10% tariff on everything works with the reciprocal tariffs. If you'd like to read the actual declaration Trump made, you can find it at whitehouse.gov.)

Canon has a majority of their production in Japan. Nikon has the majority of its production in Thailand. Sony manufactures in both those countries. OM Digital Solutions manufactures in Vietnam. So you can see that someone's going to be taking it on the chin, perhaps everyone. Note that Nikon's Z5II announcement was likely priced with some potential tariff accommodation in mind, but I can assure you Nikon was not expecting 36% tariffs on their gear coming into the US. I suppose the only good news for camera makers is that smartphone makers are also locked into the same nonsense. 

Interchangeable lens cameras have not been made in the US since Kodak cancelled the SLR/n over nearing two decades ago (and that was basically reassembling a Nikon DSLR into an American made body). We're not likely to get anyone thinking about making them again, even with substantive tariffs in place, so for photographers, the tariffs really represent a new tax on gear. A tax that is likely to be constantly changing as the administration starts to discover exactly what chaos they're creating and tries to adjust their toupees policies. Of course, they don't care about the camera market—it's not big enough to offset anything they want to do—so it may be worse for photography than it is for other markets that have some sort of leverage to trigger renegotiations. 

You may remember that after the US election last fall, I cancelled plans for changes and expansions to my business. I anticipated this chaos. You cannot plan into total uncertainty; the likelihood that you'll waste both your time and money is not just high, but presumable. As it is, retaliation by other countries will likely impact my ebook business, and I may have to put a geofence on purchases because of that (a one person business cannot easily handle 200+ reciprocal grudge tariffs). 

While I try to avoid political discussions, today's announcement reminds me that most people don't know the difference between ignorant and stupid. Ignorance is when you don't know that you shouldn't do something. Stupidity is when you shouldn't do it and know what the outcome is likely to be, but you do it anyway. The US's newly stated tariff policies are stupid. 

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Oh, you wanted the bulleted bottom line? Then:

• Camera gear in the US will get more expensive because it will all be tariffed.
• Predicting what you'll have to pay for new gear will get impossible as tariffs may change, and if inventory piles up, there will have to be sales of some sort.
• Sales of camera gear will slow as the economy slows.
• More camera dealers will close their doors because they live off of sales turns, and those will go down at higher prices.
• Many items will get harder to find in stock as camera companies shift new product shipments to non-tariff nations.
• Repairs will take longer, as no camera subsidiary wants to bring in extra parts they have to pay tariffs on.
• Repairs will cost more, as the tariff has to be recovered for the part that they waited for.
• Camera companies will listen to American customers less, as we'll be a smaller part of their overall sales.
• Cheap Chinese accessories will go up in price because the loophole they were using (deminimis) is now closed.

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Bonus coverage: What do the macroeconomic models say about price increases and/or tariffs?

First, a caveat: macroeconomic modeling is never right. The actual economy is more complicated than we can model, and people's behaviors can alter over time, making it mathematically more difficult to come up with a perfectly accurate assessment. Moreover, there are several hundred different macroeconomic models available to run (and more that are private), and they differ in some of their economic assumptions. Keynesian and Friedmanian assumptions have some key differences, for example. That said, models do produce useful results to consider, and many recent models tend to predict within a narrow band from what actually happens. We're not yet to the Seldon level of mathematics, but we do have tools that are useful and have proven to be within a reasonable margin of error.

I tried a few different models to try to get a sense of what might happen with near universal tariffs. But the simplest model is the most direct and easiest to understand (and most likely to be further off from the final result). Here's what it says: if you apply a 25% price increase to all products in the GDP, inflation of course jumps to reflect that. Indeed, this would be called hyper inflation. In response to that level of inflation, the Fed will almost certainly have to raise interest rates more than the inflation rate to try to keep that from becoming the start of runaway inflation. Meanwhile, the GDP goes down over 6%, which is a severe recession. Jobs don't tend to get hurt much short term, but wages don't track with inflation at all. The problems get worse over time.

Now, the tariffs range from 10% to 54% and don't apply to all products, obviously. Some native-made products will escape a forced price increase. However, corporate behavior is pretty predictable. If you make widget in the US that sells for US$1 and all the competitive widgets from overseas sell for US$1.10 to US$1.54, you're going to raise your price, at least up to the level where you still get the sale. This is why I used a midrange (25%) value for price increases in the model.

This also introduces us to the notion of sensitivity to inflation. What happens to the GDP at different inflation levels? At somewhere between 5 and 10% inflation, the GDP goes from growth to contraction. Between those two numbers (5% and 10% inflation) interest rates would likely double. 

If we run the simplified model at a lower 15% overall price increase to all products (some will be more, some will be less, which again introduces a bit of unpredictability), we get a very bad result: recession and stagflation. Stagflation is what happened to Japan in the 90's and from which they're still trying to recover from today. Repeated fiscal stimulation (low interest rates, direct stimulus, etc.) simply built up the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 200% in Japan. Coupled with the proposed renewal of the original Trump tax cuts along with promised new ones, America would be doing the same thing Japan did: increasing the deficit without getting economic growth. 

I simply want to remind everyone in the US reading this article of a simple truth: this is what you voted for (surprise: I didn't). Despite his denial, Project 2025 was clearly always going to be a central goal of a second Trump administration. He also telegraphed much of his expected policies in his first administration, but there were still a few adults in the room at the time that helped restrain him. Not so much this time. 

The sad news is that there are Republicans in the House and Senate who understand what I just wrote and know the likely consequences of supporting the President, but do so anyway. 

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Further Update: So now that the press has been able to ask questions and get responses, we now see the "formula" by which Trump calculated tariffs. It's nonsensical. Moreover, we've now read through all the tariff schedule, and guess what, we're going to tariff penguins and one of our own military bases 10%! No, you cannot make this stuff up—oh wait, the one with the weave actually did make it up—but if you don't believe me, try reading TechDirt's full analysis and explanation. Anyone who thinks the whole tariff schedule shows great leadership is just showing their own stupidity. I can't say that more plainly. 

I'm sure you noticed it. Not only are we seeing a slowdown in new camera introductions, but there's this "haven't I seen that before" thing going on, too. Consider:

• Canon R50V — yet another attempt to catch up to the Sony ZVs and cater to Gen Z creators
• Fujifilm GFX100RF — an un-stabilized X100 with a larger sensor
• Panasonic S1RII — your basic modernization of a six year old camera, otherwise known as overdue iteration
• Canon Powershot V1 — an attempt to catch up with the Sony ZVs and cater to Gen Z creators
• OMDS OM-3 — an OM-1 II in a different body
• Nikon Coolpix P1100 — a P1000 with virtually no changes, certainly no significant ones
• Leica SL3-S —An SL3 with a 24mp sensor to impart faster frame rates (so even Germany is playing the deja vu game)

That's the entire 2025 announcements so far, except for the Sigma bf.

The bf certainly hasn't been seen before (though the mill out a solid aluminum block to get a body thing has been done before). Other than that shiny bf, it feels like the entire camera industry has stalled. New ideas don't exist. New technologies are rare. Fixing clear, basic problems that existed in previous cameras isn't really happening. Nor is trying new things. Instead, what we're getting is rudimentary iteration and proliferation. Hmm, maybe the camera companies have been using AI for longer than I thought ;~). 

Not that Sigma got it right while all the rest sat on their hands and contemplated their navel. The bf, it seems to me, is a solid body and UX idea that was implemented wrong. Simple controls, small body. That doesn't say full frame to me. Ironically, the similarly small lens that makes the most sense on the Sigma bf is the Panasonic 18-40mm f/4.5-6.3. Yes, there's less than a half dozen suitably-sized Sigma primes (e.g 17mm f/4, 24mm f/3.5, etc.), but versatility is not in the bf's likely lens use set. The minute you start trying to get some more sophistication on the lens side, you bulk up the little camera considerably, ruining its primary attribute. Let me say it: the bf should have used a 24mp APS-C sensor, and Sigma would still need a better crop sensor L-mount lens set on top of that to make the idea fully work. Oh, and if you're going to give us a fixed LCD camera with no viewfinder, don't use a standard TFT panel! It's not bright enough nor can those hip creators wearing their polarized sunglasses see it. 

Of course, you and I won't be buying a Sigma bf, anyway. Mostly because Sigma can't more than about 2500 units a year with their current production lines. Thus, the bf is about as unobtainium as you can get. So if, as some of us believe, that the bf may represent a true and useful rethinking of what a small camera should be, we won't be able to verify or refute that. 

I could do the same sort of analysis on all the 2024 camera introductions, too, but it isn't worth my time. I'd just be iterating what I wrote above ;~). 

I'll repeat something I've written for over 20 years: the camera companies need to get better in touch with their actual users. My list of unfixed, overly complicated, or problematic things just for Nikon alone is a sprawling list that just keeps getting bigger. And those of us covering the industry have such lists for every camera maker, meaning that the number of unaddressed things is getting dissertation sized. Personally, if the camera makers want my money now, they're going to have to start whittling down that list. 

To quote Yogi Bera: the future ain't what is used to be.

We need to talk about a chart that Fujifilm executives pulled up during the recent introduction of the GFX100RF, a camera that does not have sensor-based or lens-based image stabilization:

We have a lot to unpack here. The claim Fujifilm makes is that under the "normal" handheld use of the GFX100RF, image stabilization isn't necessary (blue area, lower right corner). This is based upon the assumption that people can steadily handhold 1/focal length, which in the case of the GFX100RF would be 1/28 second. Another way of deciphering the chart for the camera they just introduced is that Fujifilm recommends a tripod for anything slower than 1/28 second, handholding for 1/28 or faster shutter speeds. 

This is a little disingenuous, as any photo instructor can tell you that there's a large subset of the population that can't (or won't) hold a camera steady at 1/focal length. Fujifilm seems to refer to this group as "Snap" under the section where image based image stabilization (IBIS) works. The GFX100RF doesn't have IBIS, so you "snappers" should probably avoid the camera ;~). Okay, you "snappers" are going to need higher shutter speeds to compensate for your movement. But that's where the f/4 aperture of the lens starts to come into play. The base ISO of the camera is 80, so the Sunny 16 exposure is f/4 at 1/1280. No problems there. Heavy overcast probably puts you at f/4 and 1/80, so you're still probably okay. But if you move into edge of day, night, or less well lit indoors scenes, you're at or beyond that 1/28 limit. But if you're a "snapper" and need two more stops to be "steady," Sunny 16 is 1/320, overcast is 1/20, and indoors and edge of day, well, good luck.  

The good news is that the GFX100RF uses a leaf shutter, which doesn't tend to impart additional slap, so it really comes down to how steadily you hold the camera as to whether or not you'll get the full acutance goodness from those 100 megapixels. As I tried to point out, some may find the IBIS-equipped 40mp X100VI a better choice when all is said and done.

But Fujifilm's chart probably raised a few other points you want to know about. First, they show something around 16mm only allowing 1/2 second exposures with IBIS, and that shutter speed gets progressively higher as you increase the focal length. Fujifilm has a "normal" focal length lens showing as only good to about 1/6 second with IBIS engaged, and the range at which they say "IBIS Works" is only 3.5 stops. 

Olympus has made claims of 1 second handheld, and we now have many makers claiming 8 stops of correction for their stabilization systems. Is Fujifilm lagging behind, or are you getting gamed?

You're getting gamed. 

While there's no doubt that IBIS systems are beneficial, the marketing messages and claims about them are at best case exaggerated, at worst case deceptive. 

Let's begin with one thing suggested in that Fujifilm chart: the range at which IBIS is useful shifts as focal length increases. This is absolutely true. You can't violate geometry. (Well, you could, but only by making up pixels where they aren't. See: AI.) Moreover, sensor movement has a limited range, so even if you wanted to try to 100% correct things at 200mm, you might not be able to if the "shake" is too great.

Which brings us to CIPA. CIPA is a marketing organization that all the Japanese camera makers belong to, and which, among other things, assigns standards by which the member companies need to comply. This includes how you measure the size of a product, how you weigh it, and much more. One of CIPA's standards has you strapping your camera/lens to a special platform that is intended to create a repeatable, simulated camera movement. You might have noticed that over time the numbers being reported for that test have gone up. You probably thought that was entirely due to IBIS systems getting better. Well, some of that has happened, but in practice, I'm not seeing the same level of improvement in real world testing. We didn't go from 2.5 stops to 8 stops in a short period. We went from the test rig was pretty crude to the test rig getting better at the simulation and the camera companies getting better at designing to the test rig. 

Next up on our list is that Fujifilm claims that IBIS doesn't work above 250mm. This is also related to the geometry, but there's much more going on here that needs explanation. First, marketing will claim that their stabilization system is 5 Axis. (That would be pitch, yaw, roll, horizontal, and vertical.) Well, sort of. IBIS can't change the pitch or yaw of the image sensor (and I believe most can't change their rotation, either, which is roll). In-lens stabilization can't change rotation, and tends not to do horizontal or vertical because then the image circle at the focus plane would be offset. 

At some point as you go higher into the telephoto range, pitch and yaw done around the optical center is the best way to correct the geometries of camera/lens movement, and IBIS becomes far less useful. Is the termination and/or crossover of usefulness at 250mm? I do not believe it is. My testing tells me that the crossover tends to occur somewhere in the 100-200mm range and that the usefulness of IBIS just tends to degrade beyond that, but not exactly terminate.

Note that Fujifilm seems to imply that Lens OIS (their form of lens-based stabilization) works all the way down 1 second with 250mm and longer lenses! Sorry guys, but that's simply not even close to true. Just as with the IBIS range Fujifilm shows in the chart, there needs to be a lens-based range, too. (And I'd argue that instead of "tripod" at the left of the lens-based IS range, it should be "gimbal".)

Our final little nugget to unpack is right up at the top of the chart: "New Exposure Program." I suspect Fujifilm is referring to Program exposure mode, that little automatic exposure-setting aid that doesn't always tell you exactly what it's doing. Nikon used to put charts for their programs in their manuals. Shame on them for omitting them these days (and having entire pages that are mostly blank but at the top say something like "The X mode sets X"; yes, you documented something, but not in any useful way). Since I don't have a GFX100RF nor the manual for it, I can't tell you how Fujifilm changed the Program exposure mode. It seems to me that with apertures only a five stop range between f/4 and f/22, to be "fully" useful said program would also need to consider Auto ISO. 

Kudos to Fujifilm for trying to explain why they didn't feel they needed to complicate the GFX100RF with sensor-based image stabilization. Some demerits for not getting things clearly explained. 

Now, if you think the above doesn't apply to you because you don't have and won't buy a GFX100RF, you weren't reading carefully enough. Image stabilization is one of those much ballyhooed "savior" features that doesn't get explained carefully enough by the camera companies. They all avoid the useful explanation for the simplified marketing message. The days of camera companies providing useful technical white papers about their features and performance seem to be long gone (rest in peace Chuck Westfall). Executives seem unable to explain things. Engineers would rather avoid talking to you. This is no way to run a consumer-facing business. 

I’ve mentioned supply chain issues in the past. Now they may be intersecting with a new problem. Let’s dive in.

One source who should know tells me that the primary supply chain issue right now is image sensors. Getting new ones not only into production but at the quantity the market might demand is apparently really tough right now. The Sony A1 II supply, for instance, is probably choking on image sensor scarcity at the moment (other low supply parts might be impacting shipments, as well). 

What apparently is happening is that when you find that you need more image sensors than you projected (and originally ordered), getting additional production on fab just isn’t going to be a simple phone call asking for more. 

You might have noticed that the final CIPA shipment numbers for 2024 exceeded the original projections back at the start of the year. Those projections are made from the conglomerated individual manufacturers production forecasts. And those original 2024 projections could be characterized as “another year like 2023.”

If you look at the monthly shipment numbers, though, you’ll see that 2024 started “hotter” than 2023 in January, then 2024 mostly mimicked 2023 until September, at which point 2024 suddenly showed growth that didn’t happen the previous year. I’ll bet some of that was image sensor orders finally catching up. The overall ILC bodies trended about 10% higher for the year. Thus, if you said to the fab you needed 100 image sensors at the start of last year, you found you needed 110. Overall, the Japanese makers needed about 600,000 more image sensors in 2024 than they did in 2023. That by itself takes up a lot of fab time and wafers.

Now let’s say you want to introduce a new camera with a new image sensor. Squeezing 10% more existing sensors out of the production lines is one thing, but now you want another 2%, but from sensors that have never been done before (or are special in that they are stacked and require more and better production time)? 

Let’s take Nikon for example. They have basically six image sensors (20mp DX, three variations of 24mp FX, two 45mp FX). Of those, four are basically older image sensors (20mp DX, two 24mp FX, one 45mp FX) and two are “special” and newer (24mp FX partial stacked and 45mp FX stacked). Everyone keeps asking when Nikon will drop a new >45mp FX sensor, a >20mp DX sensor, or another “special” sensor (e.g. stacked). Historically, their last two “new” sensors were in 2020 (Z9) and 2024 (Z6III). So age-wise we get:

• 10 years old — 24mp FX (Z5, Z6, Z6II, Zf, the latter one with minor changes)
• 8 years old — 20mp DX (all DX Z’s)
• 7 years old — 45mp FX (Z7, Z7II)
• 4 years old — 45mp stacked FX (Z8, Z9)
• 1 year old — 24mp partial stacked FX (Z6III)

If you look at the other makers, you see similar patterns. Sony’s “newest” image sensors are 2021 (2) and 2023. Getting new sensor tech on fab is slowing down and large sensor fab utilization apparently remains at 100% (or more), so new image sensors are coming more slowly now.  

So image sensors are a big part of the supply chain issues that the camera companies are struggling with.

What’s the new problem that intersects? Little or no demand for the same image sensors. Oops ;~). 

Recently I've seen three different photography sites complaining that they didn’t get any affiliate commissions for newly announced cameras, because no one clicked on the link and ordered one. 

We’ve had six cameras introduced so far this year, only two of which have new image sensors. Three of the older sensor cameras that were just introduced have little demand, and were part of those affiliate link failures I just mentioned. Another is a new body for an old inside (it’s an OM-3 on the outside, OM-1 II on the inside). So how does the market continue to grow? By selling more bodies with the same image sensor? I don’t think so.

It’s not that you can’t create a “better” camera with an “older” image sensor. The Sony A1 II and Nikon Z50II are good examples of re-invigorating a model without needing a new sensor. The Fujifilm X-M5 is a “different” camera than Fujifilm has done in the past with the same image sensor. But in general, it feels to me that a number of companies are not quite getting things right. The biggest part of their long-term success will be upgrading, not new customers buying older sensor products. 

It doesn’t help that CMOS image sensors have pretty much climbed the hill. We’ve been stuck on the top of a plateau for a while now with dynamic range (DR). As I like to put it: “in most circumstances, current cameras record the randomness of photons accurately.” Moreover, the real challenge in DR that hasn’t been breeched is saturation, not noise floor, which is where everyone's misplaced attention has been. 

The primary thing that new image sensors seem to be concentrating on is speed. Speed helps both with quantity of pixels the sensor can have, as well as things like removing the physical shutter and lowering costs (e.g. Z8, Z9). But advancements in speed are essentially driven by a form of Moore’s Law, so it’s tough to really break a new sensor out in a way that others can’t also do. Another aspect of this is that dedicated camera image sensors have traditionally been done on old, larger process fabs where you can't get "easy" speed benefits by using smaller process size. Unfortunately, fabs that can do small process are the ones that are most utilized at the moment, to the point where at the current "best" processes you have maybe four customers locking up all of production. (None of those are camera makers.)

Meanwhile, we just keep getting “more” piled into the bodies themselves via menus. I got a headache staring at the details for the just-announced Panasonic S1RII's video capabilities: over 60 different settings, which produces six different crops, has compression interdependencies, and varies in bit rate. Plus there’s some other footnotes you need to apply to fully understand a setting! 

I really have to ask how many people need 60 different FullHD, 4K, 6K, and 8K settings. How many can even keep track of what all of them do and how they differ? Are all these settings actually used by someone? Is that what we really want camera makers to concentrate on: adding more and more choices? 

Yes, I’m sure there’s some customer somewhere that will appreciate all that choice. It isn’t me, and I’m pretty sophisticated as a user. My number one request of Nikon—I predominately use Z8’s and Z9’s for my work—is to provide a truly useful save/restore settings function, not to give me another video option. A settings system where I can name my camera settings files (birding, wildlife, football, ice hockey, portrait, etc.) and restore them with a single command (or better yet, button press, e.g. Cycle saved settings). 

Which brings us to the thing that’s really holding the camera industry back: they think they’re designing hardware, not software. If you think about what a modern mirrorless camera is, it is data coming from an image sensor processed by a SoC (System on Chip), coupled with some form of interface where the customer tells the SoC what to do with that data. “Processing” and “Interface” are software tasks, not hardware ones (though they may involve some hardware). 

So while the Tokyo camera makers all wait for new image sensors and more production of them, they’re really staring at the wrong problem. They’re failing at software, not hardware. 

You can think about that this way: if I told you that you had to use the existing Sony Exmor 24mp sensor (or any other currently existing image sensor) and design the perfect camera using it, what would happen? It doesn’t matter what you think “perfect” is; such a camera would produce excellent images that print really well to 19” on the long axis (because that’s where 24mp sensor state-of-the-art is). In other words, it’s not the image sensor that’s holding anything back. 

A lot of people have poo-pooed Sigma’s recently announced bf camera. I don’t. Sigma is tackling exactly what I just asked in the last paragraph. Good on them. I see some design decisions in the bf that I agree with and many I don’t, but at least it’s not just another DSLR-like 24mp camera with as many features as we can cram into it. It’s a camera company challenging what “perfect” might actually be. 

Likewise, I’ve found I tend to like Leica’s current modern UI (DLux-8, Q3, etc.). I’m not menu diving with these cameras, I’m pretty directly making the settings changes I need to make, and only those. 

Need another example to understand my point? Look no further than the Nikon Z9. When I first was given a pre-release unit to take to Africa and test, what I found was that the Z9 was a really good camera, better than anything Nikon had done in mirrorless to date and mostly equalling or bettering what Canon and Sony were doing at the time. Then we got firmware 2.x. Then 3.x. Then 4.x. Then 5.x. Each time the already excellent camera became better. Why? Because the software was refined and added to. Amazingly, the Z9 still hasn't caught up to what Nikon knows how to do (content authentication, HEIF, Pixel shift shooting, etc.). Whether that means we get firmware 6.x or a Z9II with mostly software changes—I'd bet on an EVF upgrade, but not much else on the hardware side—doesn't particularly matter. 

While many of you sit and wait for the latest and greatest hardware to finally arrive at your dealer, I'm personally waiting for the Japanese camera companies to get better at software. Way better. Because that's really what's needed to break out of the current volume doldrums and attract both new and upgrading customers. 

Today's headline is a baseball metaphor because I know the Japanese understand baseball. I'm going to use the company I know best for my examples, but don't read too much into that: I can write essentially the same article about Canon, Fujifilm, OMDS, Panasonic, and Sony. This is a cultural problem, not a corporate one. It's time to shift the culture.

Swing and a Miss

Let's start with the most recent Swing-and-a-Miss. That would be the Nikon Coolpix P1100. You know those times when the staff finishes a product as shouts "nailed it!" Well, Nikon's staff finished the project and said whispered "mailed it!” (As in “mailed it in.”)

What was the R&D budget for the P1100, 100 yen? Notes from management to staff said (1) replace serial port with USB-C; (2) do something that says "birds" in the menus. Mailed it!

Let me be frank (okay, let me be thom ;~): the lens in the P1000 (and now in the P1100) was for the most part wasted in that camera. I personally prefer the P950 in terms of function and handling. 3000mm equivalent is really tough to handle hand-held, and the snap-back-for-tracking feature is too slow to be functional, particularly when combined with the sluggish autofocus performance. Still, for static subjects you can manage to locate at 3000mm, the lens pretty much does a solid Nikkor telephoto job. In a word, excellent. This just once again proves that Nikon knows optics as well as anyone. Too bad they sometimes fail to prove they know cameras all that well.

I really don't have a lot of issue with the image sensor, either, even though it's a small one (1/2.3"). I've spent enough time with the camera to know that I can massage a lot out of the raw files if I get everything else right. Heck, even the simplified functions and menus are livable. 

Where the P1000 (and now P1100) fall down is in making 3000mm useful. Focus performance and finding/following the subject, to be specific. And nothing was done to improve that in the new model. Worse still, there's not a single thing that the marketing department can do to regenerate any interest in this camera, as there's not even a bit of new product grizzle for them to chew on. That said, Nikon Marketing took a big swing at it with the press release (title: "Reach for the Stars") but in the end this launch was a total miss. Zero new interest at dealers on a product most people had forgotten about for good reasons.

So let's dream about the perfect swing for a moment. Simply put EXPEED7 and phase detect on sensor into the package that already exists. As Nikon just showed with the Z50II and Zf, even with older, slower image sensors this makes a substantial and important difference (plus there was a far better "birds" to add to the camera ;~). Personally, I would have done that with the P950 instead, but Nikon is trying to claim the supersuperzoom crown, so sure, P1000 it is.

Staring at Pitches

Nikon truly left the compact market—and by that I mean the highly capable compact—just prior to launching the Z System. The Nikon J5 was arguably one of the better compacts Nikon had produced. Nikon management apparently looked at the waning Nikon 1 sales as a product failure, not the management failure it actually was. 

Beyond just staring at the obvious problem and not doing anything different for seven years, management also mostly misread the market, believing that the need for a shirt pocket compact no longer existed. Another stare at a perfectly good pitch and doing nothing. 

The J5 was a perfectly fine 20mp compact when it appeared in 2015. Its image quality level would still be relevant today, what with the EXPEED improvements it would have received. But Nikon had already stopped making new lenses for the Nikon 1 line, and that was apparent to anyone paying attention. Moreover, Nikon never really got the Nikon 1 lens set right in the first place: they took a couple of practice swings and then stood in the box doing not much of anything as the pitches passed them by.

The Z30 now pretty much takes the place of the J5, though at a bit of a size penalty. So it's clear that Nikon management understands that there might be something to swing at, but they still keep hesitating with their actual swing and claim they're swinging at a different pitch (apparently they see only a "creator" on the mound). I suspect a Z30II is coming, what that PC button being important to that pitcher. But we still have issues of not seeing the full pitch dynamics and then not swinging fully. Plus we're back in the no action realm in the lens bullpen, so even if Nikon gets the camera (swing) right, they still might not manage to win the game.

Lack of Team Play

I've written now for more than three decades that Nikon's number one problem is that they don't interact with their customers. They seem to think of themselves as just a bunch of engineers doing business-to-business things with other engineers. Hmm. The last reported financial numbers say something entirely different: 46% of their sales and 540% of their profit comes from just camera and lens consumers. 

We camera buyers should feel like we're part of the team. Do you feel like part of the team? Getting Nikon Japan to recognize anything with their cameras that needs changing because of the way we use it is like looking for a dentist using only road signs in upper Mongolia. I'll give you a recent example: with the Z50II I finally helped get Nikon to make Focus point display > AF-C in-focus display default to On. This was after spending time trying to convince them that AF-C in-focus display should actually be built in (it's not the default on the Z9, Z8, Z6III, or Zf, where we finally got a function to even turn it on). 

It shouldn't be that hard. Serious, core, influential Nikon users know exactly what does/doesn't work or needs fixing. That's because we're part of the team: we're actually on the field playing the game. Management seems to be up in the Owner's Box sipping sake and swapping investment suggestions.

Here's my wish: let me put together a group of nine players (pro users), bring them to Japan, and have them spend a day telling everyone at Nikon exactly where the problems really are. What we'd buy and what we'll ignore. How we actually play the game and why we're still missing some critical gear. 

My local Philadelphia Eagles just won the Super Bowl. You don't get that far without a "team." Apparently the night prior to the game, they had a special team meeting. It wasn't the usual meeting with the coaches telling the players what they can/can't/should/shouldn't do. Instead, each of the veteran players got up and shared their views. By the time all the speechifying and rallying was done—apparently left tackle Jordan Mailata picked up the podium, shook it, and just yelled "One More!"—the reports are that the coaches and players actually left that meeting feeling more together as a team than ever, and you saw that in the first half of the game if you watched it.

When was the last time you saw a photographer and a camera company 100% on the same page like that?