Cameras and Photography Explained

LEDE ON

We’re nearing the end of summer (often defined as ending with Labor Day here in the US). Many of you have been vacationing in inflationville, and are getting ready to head back to work. So here’s the question: how many photos did you take? 

——————————

News

Kumamoto Back Online

The earthquake in Japan that shut down the Sony facility that makes image sensors, began a staged restart on August 4th, about a week after the 7.1 magnitude tremor hit nearby. Full production resumed on August 19th, and things moved much faster than what happened in 2016, when a previous quake shut down the same plant for three-and-a-half months. Meanwhile, the TSMC facility in nearby Kikuyo has also come back online, as has the Renesas plant in Nishiki. 

——————————

News and Commentary

Nikkei’s Total Camera Market Shares

Every year about this time we start getting the final reports on how things went the previous year for all the Japanese camera companies globally (as opposed to regionally). The first one up is the total camera shipments (compacts and interchangeable lens):

The big news everyone is reporting is that Fujifilm overtook Nikon for third place in overall market share. But note that Fujfilm had more new model introductions and has three strong-selling compact cameras that influence that, while Nikon continues to pull back from compact cameras (wrong decision, Nikon). As I worried about, Nikon taking over RED has caused the usual issue of slowing the entire organization down as it tries to manage the acquisition and get everything and everyone re-aligned. 

You can tell that compacts were a big part of that overall market share shifting, as Ricoh suddenly hit single digits (2.1%, up from 0.8%). 

But the full bragging right probably happens in the Canon versus Sony contest. After slowly eating into Canon’s overall market share, in 2025 Canon suddenly moved closer to historical levels of dominance while Sony slipped significantly (~4 percentage points). 

I’ve been covering these market numbers since about 2005, and while they reveal interesting short-term patterns—for instance, the recent resurgence of compacts—be careful about reading too much into them. All of the Japanese camera companies are masterminds at micromanaging how their economics work. They’ll take stabs at growing through market share increases, they’ll take respites where they try to emphasize price and margin, they’ll dump inventories into specific markets, and they’ll take their time when they expect to make a major changeover in something. Essentially, each one is constantly using the gas pedal and the brake pedal, as necessary, to produce the results they want (or sometimes need) short term. 

The one thing I would note, however, is that Nikon clearly missed the opportunity for re-introducing substantive new compact cameras. Ditto to OMDS, who also saw a market share slide. 

Looking carefully at the numbers (and year to year), you see more clearly why the rankings changed. In particular, note Ricoh, who went from 70,000 units to 210,000 units a year, implying that the GRIV sold somewhere near 150k units on its own. Fujifilm’s number boost, too, was high, from 740,000 units to 1,160,000 units, and you have to wonder how much of that gain was beginning to truly fulfill X100VI demand, coupled with the introduction of two other new compacts (GFX100RF and more importantly, the inexpensive X half). 

I’d judge most serious photographers to be mostly satisfied and bored with their current cameras. The prolific Sony had trouble keeping their unit volume up, despite the update of the mainstream A7. What seems to be being bought most at the moment is “something different that what I currently own.” Even the Nikon ZR fell into that category and has done decently, despite being basically a Z6III with a simplified UI, no viewfinder, and a new raw video format. (I should note that I don’t have access to global sales by individual camera, though I do have access to some regional data from which to make such judgments.)  

To some degree unit volume reports like this Nikkei one, can also indicate churn. When companies iterate often, some of that is intended at getting their user base to update. When companies iterate less often, they almost certainly don’t benefit from model churn in their user base. What I’m not seeing in my surveys that I used to see is significant leaking from brand to brand. 

But I’m not sure any of the above is as important as my next section of this week’s summary. The overall camera market that is currently dominated by the Japanese is relatively flat in volume (other than compact cameras), and the camera companies are all micromanaging how they profit from something at or near their current level of sales. But that is probably in danger, to whit:

——————————

Commentary

Japanese Lenses Under Attack

TTArtisans this past week shipped their second inexpensive Neo lens, the US$99 autofocus 85mm f/1.8. Like the 50mm f/1.8 before it (and which I have in review testing), TTArtisans has gone the simpler route; this lens doesn’t have a manual focus ring. The approach here seems to be to cut features but make a very usable lens nonetheless. No function buttons, no AF/M switch, no focus ring, etc., just a simple basic lens that can undercut the Japanese makers on price. At US$99, that’s one heck of an undercut.

But it’s not going to end there, folks. The zooms are coming.

With 24 to 85mm prime lenses covered by many Chinese lens makers—in some focal lengths, multiple times—the next step is to grab the two primary zoom purchases: 24-70mm, and 70-200mm. Meike is already stating that they have f/2.8 zooms coming, and I’ve now heard from two other Chinese makers about impending zooms, as well. We’ve even seen brands like Laowa take on the exotics, with their 200mm f/2 lens. 

The cat is not only out of the bag now, but it’s running around jumping on all the furniture and constantly scratching it to see what happens. What happens is that Japanese camera industry economics go down the drain, as the 1.5x lens attach rate that is relied upon in Tokyo is now in jeopardy. Actually, most of the mirrorless makers at one point or other told me that they felt that their attach rate would go up significantly (Nikon execs publicly forecast 2x but never got above 1.6x before dropping back to just below 1.5x). My sense from my user surveys is that new mirrorless users (and those that have been switching from DSLRs) are indeed buying more lenses, but a number of those have been sampling of the Chinese offerings.

Long-time readers of mine know about Sampling. It’s a user practice outside of brand loyalty that ultimately undermines a brand. 

The irony here is that the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) just published a report that essentially says that the Japanese digital camera industry shows signs of recovery after a long-downhill slide against the adoption of smartphones as cameras. First, that report seems “late.” Any recovery (of sorts) really began in 2023 as the supply-chain issues caused by the pandemic started to loosen. However, “recovery” in METI's sense means more like “bottomed out and now more closely mimics overall economic growth.” 

The quotes I’ve seen from the report seem to not have statistical verification and are coupled with equivocation, such as “…likely due in part to the…demand from younger generations for use in social media and video sharing.” I’d point out that products such as the DJI Osmo and Insta360 have shown much more take-up with that group than I can measure from the Japanese makers. 

Which brings me to this: the Chinese ILC cameras are coming. Specifically, in February 2027 it now appears. It should be interesting to read METI’s next (late) report. 

Likewise, it will be interesting to see Nikkei’s 2026 report next year, as they already leave out foreign operations such as Hasselblad and Leica. So when the Chinese start selling a significant number of cameras, what will Nikkei’s Japan-made-only numbers look like? By way of comparison, DJI appears to have sold over 22,000 units just at Amazon US in July (that’s cameras, not drones)! That run rate makes a mockery of Nikkei’s “global camera volume” numbers. If we count DJI’s various Osmo offerings, they would have been in a solid third place for 2025 in terms of unit volume, and growing rapidly. 

Note to Japanese executives: you missed another turn. 

——————————

A Look Backwards

First But Not First

It’s curious to me how Nikon keeps getting things right, but then messes that up. This has occurred many times in Nikon’s history—for instance Nikon was first to engineer autofocus and vibration reduction but didn’t actually spin usable consumer products with them first—and this problem continues to this day. Eventually, someone else runs with the same ideas and shows how to really do them in a way that resonates with users, and then Nikon follows. Despite having been early to the idea. So this has to be something endemic to the way engineering works at Nikon.

The two somewhat recent examples are the Nikon 1 (mirrorless) and KeyMission (action/pocket). 

Nikon 1 introduced a bunch of things we take for granted today: dual gain sensor, phase detect on sensor, and much more, including what Apple today does as Live Photos. Lots of great, new ideas were in the Nikon 1 products, and that doesn’t surprise me, as much of the early design work was done by the same leader and team that created the Nikon D3, a seminal camera in digital photography history. That group was tasked with finding “the next important things” and they most certainly did. If the D1 was the camera that first put together all the things that we associate with DSLR, the Nikon J1 and V1 were the cameras that first put together all the things that we now associate with mirrorless.

Unfortunately, management nerfed the resulting products for fear that they would cut into the DSLR line. Then the quake, tsunami, and flood hit and pretty much stopped all DSLR production, leaving the Nikon 1 the only thing that Nikon could sell. And it did, partly because it had to. Nikon spent big money on advertising (remember Ashton Kutcher as the spokesperson), and that worked.

Sort of worked. One of the primary complaints was that the Nikon 1 didn’t align with much of anything in the DSLR lineup. About the only accessory crossed over to DSLRs was an F-to-CX mount adapter. Flash? Incompatible. Other accessories? Incompatible. GPS? Incompatible. Interface and menus? Different. In essence, you were either a Nikon 1 user or a Nikon DSLR user. You couldn’t easily grow from being a Nikon 1 user to a Nikon DSLR user. 

Moreover, the Nikon 1 had the same fundamental flaw that Nikon keeps repeating: customers balked at some features, feature limitations, overly complex things, the lack of DSLR carryover, and most importantly, clumsy UI. I wrote that the D1 was the kick-off of DSLRs earlier, and it had many of those same problems. The Nikon engineers engineered things, but they weren’t actually using them or talking to the customers that would. The result with the D1 was a modal camera that was frustrating to use in real life, yet proved to be the basis of what we really wanted. Fortunately, Nikon quickly fixed the user issues with the subsequent D1h and D1x models. 

Nikon 1 cameras had the same problem. Take the V1, for instance. It had three or four things that shouldn’t have made it past early design stage (in addition to the DSLR accessory nerfing). All of them had to do with control use, fidelity, and placement on a small camera. It was far too easy, for instance, to accidentally change whatever Exposure mode you had selected into one of the special modes, meaning you missed moments in time on what was otherwise a very fast camera. It was also easy to accidentally turn off the camera, as the on/off button was adjacent to the shutter release. And yet I could do things at the time with that V1 that I couldn’t with my Sony NEX; I just would find myself swearing at some design elements (of both cameras, actually) from time to time. 

There’s no reason why today we shouldn’t have a current and more complete Nikon 1 line. It would rock given the upgrades it would have now, and be the compact camera of choice against the fixed lens Fujifilm, Pentax, and Sony models. But instead of fixing the issues, Nikon just seemed to randomly experiment for awhile and never quite ironed out the usability issues, which, of course, eventually impacted sales. Coupled with the fact that unit volumes of all cameras were dropping dramatically during the Nikon 1’s lifespan, it apparently was easier for management to drop the Nikon 1 rather than address the real issues it had.

Which brings us to the KeyMission. Once again, Nikon correctly saw that there was a market that their existing offerings weren’t serving. GoPro was the one of the first to identify that market in between smartphone and traditional cameras. Ironically, neither GoPro nor Nikon truly understood what they should be doing there. You only have to look around at the DJI and Insta360 extensions, alterations, additions, and accessories to see that there’s much more market there than just a small box that’s water and shockproof. 

The KeyMission 360 was actually the D1 to what DJI and Insta360 now deliver as much more completed and competent solutions (Osmo 360 and Insta360 x6, respectively). The KeyMission 170 was for some reason, a GoPro clone without distinction, which seems to indicate that Nikon didn’t really know how to extend this market. The KeyMission 80 crossed over into the creepy wearable territory that today is occupied by Meta and its glasses and nobody seems to be able to get any traction with. 

So once again we saw Nikon seeing things (other than what the KeyMission 170 should have been) in advance of the rest of the camera world, but essentially fumbling any early advantage they might have had. 

Alongside those two (Nikon 1 and KeyMission) sat the ill-fated DL line: three compact cameras that, even today with the specs and features Nikon announced in 2016, would be, with updates, pretty clear winners now that the compact camera market is expanding again. Ditto the Coolpix A.

This we-see-the-future-but-fail-to-see-the-future aspect of Nikon’s management seems entrenched given that it has existed over multiple generations of executives running the show. It’s the reason why Canon dominates dedicated camera sales—at least if we don’t count DJI and Osmo360—and not Nikon. You even see this in messaging from Nikon management: “generate stable profits” and “secure stable earnings” are the constantly repeated mantras in the business planning documents for Nikon Imaging from top management. The current management plan has a target of a 25% revenue growth over the next four years, but as we’ve all seen with the recent tariffs and price increases, that doesn’t necessarily mean selling more units, let alone more interesting cameras and lenses. 

Many times in Nikon’s past we’ve gotten the impression that they simply want to “milk Imaging [cameras] to provide cash for Precision [semiconductor manufacturing equipment].” Note that Omura-san said recently “select[ing] businesses…and growing them significantly.” Missing in that presentation was that Imaging would be grown significantly, despite Imaging “performed steadily” while Precision “fell far below assumptions.” Worse still: apparently the RED acquisition tilted things the wrong direction for management: “Issue: upfront burden of video-related investment.” It’s also clear that Nikon thinks that the RED acquisition will ultimately provide much of what revenue growth Imaging does generate.

As I’ve described now for almost thirty years on my Web site, the missing component for Nikon is simple: lack of customer understanding and embrace. Even Omura-san admits this: “our poor results stemmed from insufficient attention to what customers need and want to realize.” The problem is, I believe that statement to be more about business-to-business customers, not the 40-50% of the business (Imaging) that is consumer-facing. I say that because I’ve seen near zero—despite repeated discussions with Nikon and Nikon executives—to indicate that Nikon is hearing us consumers. 

I’ll give a recent example. I got an email from a reader who had a recent encounter with the Japanese service technician at Melville. Their conversation centered around the lack of control configuration for subject detection, to which the technician was surprised and intently took notes he was going to relay to Japan. Great, but I’ve had (as have others) that same conversation with multiple Nikon employees and executives several times now, and we still haven’t seen the issue addressed. So, yes, Nikon went from not listening to listening. But ultimately, it’s actions based upon that listening that counts most with customers.

Now this may all seem negative, that I might be predicting the demise of Nikon Imaging. Nope. It’s basically the same thing I’ve been writing for 30 years now: Nikon’s lack of direct connection with consumers blocks them into being a smaller player than they could be. Sony has Kando, Fujifilm has Fujikina, Canon has…well, a lot of marketing. What does Nikon have that’s interacting directly with camera customers? That’s my point in writing these articles. Long-term Nikon customers aren’t exactly happy with the level of interaction we get from the company, NPS notwithstanding. As it is, I tend to have better discussions with Fujifilm executives at trade shows than I do with Nikon ones, and I suspect much of the photographic press would tend to agree with me on this. That needs to be fixed. Because the ultimate way to grow a business in a healthy way is to embrace your best customers and make them happier. 

Overall, I expect Nikon to continue to do what they’ve done: engineers figure out the next innovation and then management lets other companies get the biggest benefit from it. For sure, the Z System line will only get stronger with the next generation, but the real need is to leapfrog in ways that restores the excitement Nikon Imaging has at times generated at the same time as embracing the consumer more closely.

I note that the two ways Nikon fully described in their current management plan as to how they’d get new Imaging customers were “apps and 1-to-1 marketing to stimulate lens add-ons and step-ups” to improve profitability, as well as “leverage RED’s cinema industry network…to rebuild Nikon’s brand as a cinema camera maker.” I’ll make a bet prediction: when we revisit those statements at the end of the current plan in 2030, the first of those will have failed, and the second will have been only modestly successful. 

The thing that puzzles me is this: what I’m suggesting is not rocket science. It’s a well proven and oft-followed strategy. Indeed, some of Nikon’s key competitors clearly do better at this. 

Personally, I don’t care if Nikon is #3 or #4 (or #1 or #2) in cameras. Somehow, despite all the above, I have cameras today that far exceed the capabilities of what I used to be able to do, and with only a few complaints, are everything I need. Nikon’s never had difficulty at that: even when they miss a turn, don’t embrace an innovation, or have external issues that hold them back, they still manage to eventually put out quality gear that works. I don’t see any change to that happening in the next few years, as the engineering teams have shown their ability to innovate/iterate for decades now. 

It’s the crossover from engineering to marketing (and back) that Nikon struggles with from time to time, and it’s never been fixed. Here’s a thought: make that (embrace consumers) an addition to the medium term business plan. After all, it resonates with the other wording that’s being used in Nikon’s presentations. It just needs a commitment to actually do it.

LEDE ON

The camera makers must hate the photo press. Specifically, the American camera company subsidiaries must really dislike the “any news is worth reporting” rumors sites that will scrape virtually any post anywhere made by anyone if it looks like news. 

This past week we had another example of the “discontinued/unavailable” saga that isn’t always what it seems. Basically, here’s how it typically goes: a Japanese company in Japan sends out an advisory to Japanese dealers that some product will be unavailable to order. On ocassion, the company will also send out a local-to-Japan news release saying the same. Here’s the thing that makes for the subsidiary hate: the item very well may be and usually is still available in other subsidiaries (Americas, Europe, Asia, et.al.). Often, these notices are quickly done and use boilerplate language, which doesn’t help. 

Here in the US we see these “not available” announcements spread like a wildfire in high winds via the Interwebs, yet they very rarely apply to us. They're reported because “it’s news.” Sure, news that Japan is still doing the thing that Japan has always done: severely micromanaging production and where it is distributed. Ironically, the Japanese companies often ship less product to their own country, as they see profit potential higher elsewhere.  

So, if you want a Nikon 600mm f/6.3 VR S lens just order it. Unless you’re in Japan.

——————————

News

NoPro Now Possible

GoPro released it’s second quarter financial results, and basically it can be interpreted thusly: without someone coming in to buy and take over the company, we’re toast. 

Revenue down 31%, units down 38%, cash on hand down 45% and now far less than a quarter’s worth of their usual quarterly operating expenses. All terrible numbers considering they launched the new Mission1 in the quarter. Meanwhile, GoPro carries US$87.2m in principal debt, a significant part of which falls due near year end. I’d say that the debt situation is actually the real nail in the coffin. Normally you’d see private capital looking to swoop in and reorganize the company, and do so with new debt. But the current numbers preclude that without bankruptcy to first restructure the debt. 

Another interesting aspect showed up in this quarter’s numbers: direct online sales were up 13%, while subscription revenue was up 11%. It was the retail outlet drop of -48% that was the biggest issue. GoPro now has the Nikon KeyMission problem: it costs money to stock the retail channel, particularly when you’re using Big Box so heavily. That money sucks away at your profit margin, and when sales slump, it makes the business untenable. Which is why Nikon waltzed into the action camera business and waltzed right out the door soon after.

The online and subscription numbers suggest that a far, far smaller GoPro is probably still viable. Something closer to US$50m a quarter in sales (which would be less than one-quarter their peak in 2021). But then that debt just looks huge, as you can’t pay it down fast enough at that sales volume.

The prediction market is now something where you can place bets. Here’s where my money would go if I were to bet (disclosure: I won’t): bankruptcy followed by a buyout by someone such as Logitech, who would value the IP and who has the distribution system that could absorb the products (further disclosure: we sold the very profitable QuickCam business I created to Logitech). 

——————————

Re-News

Maybe Sony Isn’t Moving Faster

After being the only maker making any summer camera announcements, it turns out that one of those new products will now have delayed delivery. The Sony FX5, originally scheduled for an August release, has been pushed back to a mid-September first chum. I haven’t seen an official explanation for this, only heard about it second-hand through non-official sources. 

We could speculate about the why—parts shortage, higher-than-expected initial orders, production issue—but that doesn’t really matter as long as this ends up just a one-month postponement. It does dilute the PR benefits a bit, as now the actual delivery will likely fall in a period where other products are being announced

——————————

Advice

Two Black Holes Are Colliding

It’s normally about this time of year that I start getting the “should I buy now or wait until the holiday season for specials?” emails. In most years, buying in September or October typically is not something I recommend, as the camera makers like to push volume into the holiday season, and that’s where you start seeing the good discounts. This year, however, is hinting that it might be different.

The two black holes of the headline are Price and Availability. They are related. For instance, Price is both due to constantly changing tariffs but also due to the fact that most of the chips used in a camera—but particularly the memory chips—are going up in price. Availability of memory is currently on a low-to-none curve for camera makers, and other key parts are still, for some reason, in short supply too. The camera market is like a little mouse trying to stay out of the way of mammoth dinosaurs causing chaos and destruction everywhere. AI is the Godzilla that’s attacking Tokyo consumer electronics.

The goto strategy in Tokyo when under delivery pressures is to emphasize high end products. What memory and parts they do get will tend to first go into the highest-priced, highest-margin products. Discounts to move volume also tend to disappear under this strategy. More often than not you see bundling strategies, as in camera+lens discounts, becoming the new incentive norm. 

The greatest danger is in the under US$2000 market. You might have noticed that the under US$1000 full frame options have basically disappeared. The Canon RP is on its last gasp at US$1000 clearance. Nikon is currently pushing its remaining Z5’s at about US$150 above where they once sat. I don’t know how long either will last before they go away completely. They might not make it to Christmas, at which point full frame mirrorless then starts 50% higher, at about US$1500.

Meanwhile, crop sensor has been creeping up towards US$1000 (with many already over that mark). It wasn’t that long ago that Nikon said you needed to be able to sell a camera (then DSLR) at US$399 to remain competitive in the entry market. Not so much today, as entry seems to be somewhere in the US$600 or US$700 range, and then only on discount.

Which brings me to this: discounting is the usual method of increasing holiday shopping volume. But what happens when the camera makers don’t have volume to sell? We very well may find out this year. The good news on that front is that when I look at the inventory levels from most makers’ recent financials, there’s been a small creep upwards. It’s possible that they have enough parts and finished products to make it through to the new year, but then the question becomes: how do they survive the first quarter of 2027? 

I wouldn’t put it out the question that we see a fall price increase from some or many makers, allowing them to appear to discount during the holidays. One problem, however, is that other things that you might need in addition to a new camera, such as new memory cards or more storage for your computer, are also increasing in price. The customer trying to put together a gift system in December 2026 is going to find they need more sheckles than last year.

For most of this site’s history I’ve been pretty consistent: only buy what you need. This year that advice is doubled down and augmented with “if you believe you need something in the next few months, you might want to consider getting it now if you can afford it.” I don’t see photography getting less expensive any time soon (and that includes using smartphones). I recognize the current situation from past tech cycles: we’re not in the "ramp up production to lower costs" phase. We’re in a "if you ramp up production, your costs will go up" phase. 

One pernicious aspect of capitalism and free markets is that they require growth to remain healthy. From a corporate viewpoint, that means growth in sales and profits, which drives shareholder value when done right. The problem for the camera industry right now is that there isn’t a clear way to do that in a sustained manner when other industries are dominating and disrupting their supply chain. I expect the result to be that how much you pay will be the way the companies have to deal with finding growth. If that doesn’t happen this holiday season, it certainly will be happening next year.

Your choice as a consumer is going to come down to “buy now” or “save up more for buying later.”